Due to persistent and serious threats from natural disasters around the globe, many have turned to resilience and vulnerability research to guide disaster preparation, recovery, and adaptation decisions. In response, scholars and practitioners have put forth a variety of disaster indices, based on quantifiable metrics, to gauge levels of resilience and vulnerability. However, few indices are empirically validated using observed disaster impacts and, as a result, it is often unclear which index should be preferred for each decision at hand. Thus, we compare and empirically validate five of the top U.S. disaster indices, including three resilience indices and two vulnerability indices. We use observed disaster losses, fatalities, and disaster declarations from the southeastern United States to empirically validate each index. We find that disaster indices, though thoughtfully substantiated by literature and theoretically persuasive, are not all created equal. While four of the five indices perform as predicted in explaining damages, only three explain fatalities and only two explain disaster declarations as expected by theory. These results highlight the need for disaster indices to clearly state index objectives and structure underlying metrics to support validation of the results based on these goals. Further, policy makers should use index results carefully when developing regional policy or investing in resilience and vulnerability improvement projects.
INTRODUCTION
Natural disasters cause destruction and threaten livelihoods, economic activity, and cultures in every country across the globe. In addition to these economic losses, natural disasters lead to injury and loss of life, destruction of environmental quality, psychological harm, as well as indirect losses.
(1-5) These major disruptions are huge shocks to human, social, economic, and environmental systems.
Despite risk management actions to lessen impacts, losses have increased over time (6) , motivating a new resilience management paradigm as a policy objective in the U.S. and worldwide.
Two recent U.S. Executive Orders focus on improving the understanding of resilience. (7, 8) The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development launched a $1 billion initiative to increase natural disaster resilience across communities. (9) In the wake of the 2013 Typhoon Yolanda, the Philippine government launched Reconstruction Assistance in Yolanda, an $8.2 billion plan to recover from the detrimental storm and increase resilience. (10) Other examples are found in the United Kingdom's National Resilience Capabilities Programme, Canada's National Disaster Mitigation Strategy, and the Dominican Republic's National Plan for Comprehensive Disaster Risk Management (44) (45) (46) . Thus, resilience and vulnerability to natural disasters remains an important policy objective across many governments. But how can governments quantify the impacts of the billions of public dollars spent? And how can policy makers know which areas to target for improvements?
In response to the clear need for disaster research, academics and practitioners alike have come conducted many studies in an effort to better understand resilience and vulnerability. One major focus has been the development of indices to quantify resilience and vulnerability using metrics.
In a recent United Nations review, 27 such indices were identified with spatial scales from community to country level. Disaster indices are generated for multiple purposes and therefore may exhibit significantly different performance across disaster outcomes and resilience objectives.
While all have been motivated by rich theory, few measurement frameworks have been empirically verified. (11) Although community resilience to disasters is still an emerging field and index developers often describe their products as frameworks or baseline assessments, there is little utility unless they can be confidently used to inform decision makers.
This work contributes to the field in several ways. First, we review and compare the results of five prominent disaster indices in the United States: Cutter, Burton, and Emrich's (12) Baseline
Resilience Index for Communities (BRIC); Peacock et al.'s (13) Community Disaster Resilience Index (CDRI); Foster's (14) Resilience Capacity Index (RCI) as applied to metropolitan areas by the Network on Building Resilient Regions (15) ; Cutter, Boruff, and Shirley's (16) Social Vulnerability Index (SoVI); and Flanagan et al.'s (17) Social Vulnerability Index (SVI). We then empirically validate each index to test their power to explain historical property losses, fatalities, and disaster declarations at the county-event level across states in the Southeast. We compare the results with the stated index objectives, to examine the relevance of each index and to identify best practices for index development to support further validation. Finally, we offer policy recommendations based on our findings, to enable disaster indices to be better utilized to inform policy and action.
BACKGROUND

Defining Resilience and Vulnerability
Early concepts of resilience focused on how well a system could rebound or reorganize to re-establish stability following a stress or perturbation, especially in ecological systems, engineered materials, and individual psychology. (18) (19) (20) More recently, social scientists have adopted the concept and applied it at a broader scale for human communities with respect to disasters. The magnitude of natural disaster impacts is a function of both natural and human factors (21) and thus resilience to disasters often considers inputs from factors in both domains.
Disaster resilience also occurs on multiple actor scales including individual, governmental, and private market (22) , and across multiple disciplines or community sub-systems, such as economic, social, infrastructural, and institutional networks. (12) While there is no universal definition of the term (23) , resilience implies that a system can persist and function more successfully over the duration of an event, relative to a less-resilient counterpart. These key elements are highlighted in two definitions, including the National Academy of Science's definition of disaster resilience as "the ability to prepare and plan for, absorb, recover from, and more successfully adapt to adverse events" and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's definition of "the ability of a system and its component parts to anticipate, absorb, accommodate or recover from the effects of a hazardous event in a timely and efficient manner, including through ensuring the preservation, restoration or improvement of its essential basic structures and functions". (24) (25) (26) Similar to resilience, vulnerability is a concept used to inform organizations and governments on the susceptibility of a system to a specific threat. Vulnerability is a component of the risk formula: risk = hazard x vulnerability x consequence, but has multiple working definitions across domains. Adger (27) relates vulnerability to exposure and sensitivity to stresses as well as the capacity to adapt. Linkov et al. (28) conceptualize vulnerability as a factor in system risk or the maximum losses at one point in time, whereas resilience represents the integral across all disaster time steps, including recovery and adaptation. Social vulnerability is an important component to overall vulnerability, but research on social vulnerability has trailed other concepts due to the difficulty in quantifying the concept. (16) Cutter, Boruff, and Shirley define vulnerability to natural disasters as the "potential for loss" across space and time. (16) Put differently, groups exposed to the same hazard may suffer very different impacts due to differing levels of social vulnerability. (17) Some conceptualize vulnerability as the opposite of resilience or that vulnerability encompasses resilience. Others view vulnerability as a related, but not opposite term, as vulnerability is a temporary shift in functional states, whereas resilience encompasses broader changes in the structural system or overall system stability.
Quantifying Resilience and Vulnerability
Measuring resilience and vulnerability to natural disasters is a rapidly emerging area of literature. One approach to quantification is an index, or "composite indicator", that aggregates metrics across a variety of numerical factors in order to gauge the level of disaster resilience or vulnerability across space. Cutter (2015) reviews the assortment of tools, indicators, and scorecards that currently populate the resilience literature in the United States. (64) The policy relevance of an index relies on its ability to pinpoint areas in need of improvement. Although social vulnerability and resilience may be different theoretical constructs, popular indices of vulnerability have stated goals of identifying "uneven capacity for preparedness and response and… determining differential recovery from disasters" and informing management across "all phases of the disaster cycle", which closely match the definition of, and goals of, resilience indices. (30, 17) For community disaster resilience and social vulnerability indices, metrics are chosen to fit a number of relevant sub-system categories, including human and social capital, infrastructure, economic capital, and institutional organization, or to fit the stages of a disruptive event, e.g.
prepare, absorb, recover, and adapt. Most prominent community disaster vulnerability and resilience indices in the U.S. have selected metrics that are widely collected and readily available through the Census Bureau, Federal Emergency Management Agency, and other federal agencies.
The value of these metrics are their consistent collection methodology, public availability, and frequency of collection, allowing for the monitoring of changes over time. However, as we show below, although many indices draw on similar sets of metrics, the results vary from index to index.
These disparities highlight the critical influence of the specific set of metrics selected and the method of aggregation and normalization. With many indices to choose from, all with stated purposes of assessing resilience or vulnerability in general, and with disparate resulting resilience and vulnerability rankings, it can be difficult for policy makers to understand and select the appropriate index to inform decision making and guide investment in resilience improvement.
Index validation is an important final step in index creation, but is rarely performed. (11) Many resilience indices rely on a meta-analysis of the literature and theoretical justifications to create indices, which are not the same as empirical validation. While theoretical and meta-analysis index justifications are important in setting indices within the existing knowledge base, they do not guarantee that the metrics selected will meaningfully relate to specific outcomes of interest.
Empirical validation, on the other hand, assesses the explanatory power of an index using real world observations and can estimate the ability of an index to explain a variety of disaster losses, thereby giving confidence in index ability and performance to end users. Two important efforts of validation are noted: Burton (31) tests his resilience index by visual ranking of recovery photographs before and after Hurricane Katrina, and Peacock et al. (13) validate their resilience matrix using disaster losses and fatalities. However, no research has compared performance across different index approaches or analyzed the differential results across disaster indices.
REVIEW OF DISASTER INDICES
In this paper, we analyze the performance of five prominent disaster resilience and Index (SVI). (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) These indices have assessed by others, used as a basis to build upon, applied in case studies, and added to toolkits for federal and international agencies [BRIC (56, 57, 58) , CDRI (53, 54, 55) , RCI (24, 51, 52) , SOVI (59, 60, 61 ) , SVI (61, 62, 63) ]. In this section, we describe each index in detail and provide a comparison of the stated performance.
Baseline Resilience Index for Communities
The resilience index of Cutter et al. (12) is one of the first, and more widely cited, indices in the resilience literature in its attempt to quantify resilience. The Baseline Resilience Index for Communities (BRIC) approach has the stated purpose of providing a "baseline set of conditions, from which to measure the effectiveness of programs, policies, and interventions specifically designed to improve disaster resilience". (12) BRIC is intended to quantify resilience across space and can be re-calculated over time to track changes in this baseline level of resilience. After a metrics selection process using theory and analysis of the inter-metric correlations and internal reliability, 36 metrics remain across five resilience categories: social, economic, institutional, infrastructure, and community. To form the final index score, each metric is normalized through a min-max algorithm that subtracts the minimum value across the observations and divides by the maximum value. Therefore, the scores are inherently relative to the sample of interest. relative to inland or rural areas. While this approach is well justified through theoretical and statistical means in the metric selection phase, it is not empirically validated. (12) We also acknowledge that Cutter and coauthors recently released an updated index that includes additional metrics, but follows the same categorically-based methodology. (32) We were unable to access the revised 2014 county-level index data, so we have not included the results in this analysis. 
Community Disaster Resilience Index
Resilience Capacity Index
Foster's (14) Resilience Capacity Index (RCI) has a broader scope than just natural disasters, encompassing additional stresses such as economic shocks such as major factories closing or long term population growth or economic downturns. RCI was created to measure the "resilience capacity", or the pre-disaster resilience level as an indicator of the potential performance of a location under stress. While higher resilience in the RCI is not deterministic in outcomes, "[h]aving higher capacity does imply, however, that the region has factors and conditions thought to position a region well for effective post-stress resilience performance." (15) Another key difference with the RCI compared with the other indices is that the RCI quantifies resilience at the metropolitan area 
Social Vulnerability Index (SoVI)
Cutter, Boruff, and Shirley's (16) Social Vulnerability Index (SoVI) is one of the original approaches to quantifying social vulnerability to environmental disasters and hazards and is relevant to resilience work in that it is a "…tool for policy makers and practitioners [as] it shows where there is uneven capacity for preparedness and response and… is useful as an indicator in determining differential recovery from disasters". (33) Originally based on the Hazards-of-Place model (34) , factor analysis is employed to whittle 42 vulnerability variables down to 11 normalized 
Social Vulnerability Index (SVI)
Flanagan et al.'s (17) Social Vulnerability Index (SVI) quantifies social vulnerability to disasters.
The SVI's motivation is to aid in disaster management from a social perspective, with the stated goal of "improving all phases of the disaster cycle: mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery" (17) , which again mimics the key ideas of resilience and uses similar metrics to the resilience indices (Table I) 
Comparison of Indices
The five indices selected for this study include two social vulnerability indices and three disaster resilience indices. All have the goal of describing the general ability of a community to persevere through a disruptive event and most try to capture the robustness of the physical infrastructure, business community, and residents. None focus on a specific community function (such as providing and maintaining transportation, housing, or medical services) and so all use aggregation schemes that weight individual metrics, or categories of metrics, equally. Table I identifies specific metrics that are common across two or more the indices. Yet, despite the similarities, the index results are not as consistent. Figure 6 shows the relative resilience (as reported by the indices' authors) for three sets of adjacent counties. For Figure 6 only, vulnerability scores were inverted (e.g., a score of 1, meaning not vulnerable, is displayed as a 5, very resilient)
for ease of comparison in the figure. These regions were selected from the available areas of overlap among the indices and represent three sections of the Gulf Coast, with a mix of urban, suburban, and rural areas. While there are some similar results, overall, there is not consistent agreement on the overall magnitude of resilience in a county or on the pattern of resilience across a multi-county region. In general, the CDRI and BRIC report higher capacity for these regions than do the vulnerability indices and the RCI results in the lowest capacity. 
Metrics in common with other indices:
Gini Coefficient of inequality X X Education level (ratio of college degrees to no-high school diploma) X X X X X Population with/without disability X X X Poverty rate X X X Rate of health insurance X X X X Density of civic organizations X X X
Rates of homeownership / owner-occupied units X X X Per capita income X X X Unemployment rate X X X X Median home value X X Occupied versus vacant housing units X X Figure 6 . Relative scores across indices for three sets of adjacent counties on the Gulf Coast.
Vulnerability scores were inverted in Figure 6 for consistent comparison with the resilience indices. No data exists in the BRIC for the Galveston Region in the RCI for Baldwin County.
VALIDATION METHODOLOGY
This work undertakes a first effort at validating these indices in order to identify best practices for index development that is useful to guide policy and decision making. Our objective is to empirically validate each of the five disaster indices through multivariate regression analysis.
We test the sign and significance of each index in explaining three disaster outcomes of interest, based on theory. We do not compare the magnitudes of each relationship, as these are determined, in part, by individual index assumptions and normalizations detailed above. This section details the methodology and data used for the analysis, as well as a justification for the regression form and selected variables.
Outcome Variables
Choice of outcomes to use for empirical validation must be grounded in theory. One logical choice is to use the stated objective of an index as a guide. For example, an index quantifying agricultural resilience to disasters may be empirically validated using crop or livestock losses.
However, many disaster indices do not have specific objectives or focus on a critical system function, instead quantifying disaster resilience in general. Nonetheless, three outcomes are commonly mentioned in relation to index resilience and vulnerability: property damages, fatalities, and frequency of disaster declarations. (13, 16) These three outcomes are logically related to resilience and vulnerability, and also appealing due to readily accessible data. We acknowledge that resilience and vulnerability are characterized by much more than these three outcomes. Other important areas include reductions in psychological stress, minimizing electrical losses, or speedier economic recovery. We do not believe, nor intend for, our validation exercise to be comprehensive in testing for all types of outcomes. Instead, we present the results as an important first attempt at formal empirical validation and comparison across indices.
Regression Analysis
We employ multivariate regression analysis to empirically validate the explanatory power of the five disaster indices, relative to their theoretical performance, while controlling for other potential confounding variables.
For historical property losses, we construct a conditional damage function at the countyevent level, controlling for what is in harm's way as well as event characteristics. After specification testing, we select a log-log function for goodness of fit, but note that we do not take the natural log of the disaster indices, as three of the five indices' ranges include negative values.
The resulting estimated coefficients on the disaster indices are semi-elasticities, interpreted as a unit change in the disaster index leading to a percent change in the outcome of interest. Note that one unit of each disaster index will be different, due to the differing formation and normalization algorithms used to create each index. We estimate our losses function using the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimator:
where , , is the property loss in county i due to disaster j in year t, which is a function of the capital stock (C , ) of county i in year t; the event magnitude (M , ) of disaster j in year t; the underling disaster risk rate ( ); and the index level of resilience or vulnerability ( ) in county i.
, , is the error term.
From our regression, we hypothesize that a well-performing resilience index would have a negative ( 1 < 0) and statistically significant relationship with historical property losses, meaning that a higher resilience index value is correlated with lower levels of damage. A well-performing disaster vulnerability index would have a positive ( 1 > 0) and statistically significant relationship with historical losses. This specification only includes observations with positive damages and does not sum up across all events to the county level as was the case in Peacock et al.. (13) Staying at the county-event level, instead of the county level, gives us a larger sample and allows us to control for event-specific factors such as disaster magnitude.
In our sensitivity analysis, we also control for any disaster type-specific or year-specific confounding factors with fixed effects for disaster type, , and year, . We do not use county fixed effects as our disaster indices are time invariant and would be subsumed by the fixed effect.
We also test the impact of different functional forms, including semi-log and linear, as well as population density and income instead of the capital stock. Lastly, we also test a count data estimator (negative binomial).
We next generate fatalities functions to empirically validate the indices. We use an almost identical regression framework to our damages function, except we substitute the population density (P) for the capital stock to control for people in harm's way. We use the Negative Binomial estimator, instead of OLS, as fatalities are a count variable 3 :
, ,
For sensitivity, we also test both including and omitting the disaster magnitude term for fatalities,
as not all event observations have a recorded magnitude and the sample size will be much smaller, relative to the property losses regressions with large samples. We also estimate the fatality function with the use of fixed effects, but do not prefer it as our main result due to debate over proper implementation of fixed effects in a negative binomial model can call the results into question.
Lastly, we test additional functional forms through the OLS estimator including log-log, semi-log, 
Data Sources
In order to estimate our empirical model, we assemble a panel dataset at the county-event level from 2000 to 2012 spanning ten Southeastern US states -Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas. As shown in the index maps (Figures 1 through 5) , BRIC, CDRI, and RCI only cover subsets of these ten states while SoVI and SVI cover the full extent. Also, some counties suffer more than one disaster in a year. A county with two disasters is included as two separate observations in our property loss and fatalities data sets. All together, the dataset includes more than 67,000 county- Lastly, we explain the control variables. The National Climatic Data Center reports disaster magnitudes for a subset of disaster events including flash flood, hail, high wind, strong wind, thunderstorm, and tornadoes. We perform a min-max normalization to the magnitudes, which subtracts the minimum magnitude or size across the observations of a given disaster type (e.g., tornado EF scale, hail size, etc.) and then divides by the maximum value, in order to compare intensities across different types of events. In the end, each disaster intensity has a value between 0 (least intense) and 1 (most intense). This normalization allows us to control for the intensity of each disaster event when the disaster records have different intensity units in the original data. We collect annual population density and real per capita income data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. To estimate the capital stock, we follow a common method of using the scaled (multiplicative) interaction of population and per capita income. (37) (38) (39) We scale this interaction by 2.87 -the average ratio of U.S. capita stock to Gross National Income during the second half of the twentieth century. However, the magnitude of this scale will only impact the constant term in the regression and not the estimate coefficient in our damages function. Finally, the underlying risk rate of disasters is generated by summing the total number of disaster events observed by county across our 12 year sample. 
RESULTS
We compare the performance between indices in detail, and then present regression results for each index with the three outcome variables. Table IV We also note that the correlation represent the noisiness and direction of relationship between two variables, but does not reflect the slope of the linear relationship. In addition, it does not capture non-linear relationships or the relationship between the variables and a third variable.
Lastly, given that these indices are generated across varying geographic extents, these results only represent the correlation between two indices across the spatial extents that they share. Therefore, we place most confidence in our regression results to examine the relationship between each index and the three outcomes of interest, controlling for other confounding factors. As such, indices that are highly correlated may not perform similarly in the regression analysis. Filled circles indicate the index performed as expected (and with statistical significance): negative correlation between disaster impacts and resilience and positive correlation between disaster impacts and vulnerability. Open circles indicate that index performance was opposite from expected (and with statistical significance) and no circles indicate that the results were not significantly different from zero. Overall, CDRI and SoVI perform the best, with all results of the correct sign, but the estimated coefficient on disaster declarations and fatalities, respectively, are not statistically significant. This may be partly driven by the fact that they were already empirically verified to some extent in the original analysis. In addition, RCI performs as expected for property losses and fatalities, but has an insignificant but incorrect sign for declarations. CDRI, RCI, and SVI perform best for both damages and fatalities, while SoVI performs best for both damages and disaster declarations. The results of each analysis are discussed in further detail below. We perform multiple specifications to analyze the sensitivity of each index including the use of fixed effects, log-linear and linear specification, negative binomial estimator, and different control variables. CDRI remained consistent across all specifications. RCI, SoVI, and SVI have opposite signs, but not with significance, in only a few specifications. BRIC had the correct (negative) sign in the negative binomial specification, but lacked statistical significance.
Empirical Validation Results
Property Losses
Otherwise, the results held in direction and significance across all specifications. 
Fatalities
Table VI displays the results of the fatalities functions. The functional form is identical to that of damages, except for our dependent variable (direct deaths), the inclusion of (the natural log of) population density in lieu of the capital stock to control for what is in harm's way, the exclusion of the disaster magnitude, and the estimator (negative binomial instead of ordinary least squares, incorrectly explained the probability of some fatality occurring, a majority of the flood fatalities in their sample were driven by Hurricane Katrina, whereas the fatalities in this data are from a wider range of events. In our sensitivity analysis, CDRI and RCI remain consistent and as expected across all specifications. SoVI also performs well. SVI has opposite signs when using fixed effects and BRIC was sensitive to the functional form. Other robustness checks including the inclusion of event magnitude, ordinary least squares, and fixed effects were run but did not change the qualitative results. 
Disaster Declarations
Results of the disaster declaration functions are presented in Table VII. Unlike for damages and fatalities, this approach is purely cross-sectional (no fixed effects or variation over time), with the count of disaster declarations per county from 2000 to 2012 as the dependent variable. As such, an event magnitude is not included, but the disaster risk rate as well as the underlying population 4 are controlled for. The SoVI performs best, as it is positively related to disaster declarations and is statistically significant. This is a better performance than was found in the correlation analysis performed by Cutter et al.. (16) The CDRI also has the expected (negative) coefficient, but it not statistically significant. The three remaining indices (BRIC, RCI, and SVI) all perform the opposite as expected and with statistical significance. Many factors explain disaster declarations, including political factors (16) , so this is perhaps the least reliable outcome of the three we test. However, it is a striking finding, nonetheless. In sensitivity analysis, BRIC remained positive and statistically significant across all specifications, counter to the theoretical negative result, while SoVI performed strongly throughout. CDRI, RCI, and SVI remained indistinguishable from zero in most specifications. 
DISCUSSION
The five indices analyzed here were all theoretically sound and individual metrics were analyzed using statistical techniques during index creation. However, empirical validation reveals that not all indices perform as expected. While most indices explain historical damages consistent with our hypotheses, only some explain fatalities and few explain disaster declarations with significance. We acknowledge that this is an initial and incomplete attempt at validation. Most of the indices' authors do not specifically state that their indices will explain the three outcomes tested here. We further understand that resilience goes beyond simply withstanding disruptive events and speaks to the ability of a system to recover from disturbances and adapt to changing conditions. However, these results highlight the important need for individual indices to carefully describe their intended purposes. It would indeed be unfair to expect an index to explain a specific outcome when it was not intended to predict it. However, very few indices specifically explain the outcomes that they try to speak to, so the reader is left to decide for him or herself. We review key types of purposes, as well as index limitations, in this section. Unfortunately, end users often apply indices to a host a different questions and problems, even ones for which the indices may have not been intended. One recommendation of this paper is that indices should be much clearer in what they aim to explain and should follow up with explicit testing to see if they indices perform well. This way, decision makers can know clearly which index to choose to inform certain types of decisions.
Recent policies calling for disaster preparedness and investment drives local, state, and federal managers to look for information explaining levels of resilience and vulnerability in their jurisdictions. These index approaches have been designed to be readily accessible and replicable.
Our main finding is that-despite connections between input metrics and aggregation methodsindex performance varies greatly across the five disaster indices analyzed here. It is difficult to validate measures of performance for infrequent events where specific community and disaster conditions are never exactly the same. Instead, we have developed recommendations to support improvement or development of resilience indices that allow for partial validation (across specific outcomes) and can more directly inform policy and investment decisions.
Critical Functions
While an index of overall system performance has utility for comparative purposes, communities are complex systems that perform many functions for which aggregation may obscure relevant results. Furthermore, unlike cyber-networks, military installations, or energy grids, communities rarely have a single managing authority that can make decisions for the entire system. We recommend identifying the critical functions of a community, such as electricity, telecommunications, transportation, housing/shelter, or specific industries whose continued operation will be crucial for maintaining a flow of funds during recovery. Grouping index metrics according to critical function will allow the generation of sub-scores that are useful to different decision makers with specific authority, responsibility, or capacity in each of these functional areas. The specific identification of critical functions also permits outcomes of these functions to be specifically chosen for validation.
Stages of Disruption
Following grouping by critical function, indices can also be enhanced through categorization of metrics according to the stages of a disruptive event. This process improves index utility in two ways. First, it ensures that the index contains metrics that are indicative of performance at all stages of a disruption, not just the initial event, and that no stage is overlooked or underrepresented. Metrics of the CDRI were internally classified as related to mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery and it is the highest performing index of our sample.
Secondly, grouping according to stage further improves the ability to perform partial validation on subsets of the data. The analysis described here uses outcomes largely related to the initial disasters event. However, if metrics within the indices were clearly described as being important for one or more of stages -absorbing the initial shock, recovering and reducing secondary impacts, or longterm adaptation and mitigation -each group of metrics could be independently validated against more specific outcomes. For example, number or school closing days, or change in population could be used as outcomes to indicate performance in the recovery or adaptation stages. Linkov et al. have developed a guiding framework that can be used to organize existing metrics and indices to support these validation goals. (40, 48, 49, 50) 
Sensitivity to Scale
Lastly, the use of relative index methods requires closer attention to scale. The indices presented here have been normalized or reported with qualitative scores that are only relative to the maximum and minimum score within the region of analysis. Consequently, the resulting magnitudes of the empirical validation results are not directly comparable across indices. We instead compare each result only to how it should perform based on theory. Not much discussion has been given to the variability of individual method results when applied at different scales. In order to aid stakeholders and decision makers in interpreting the results, it is important to perform some sensitivity analysis on newly created indices and clearly communicate the implications for interpretation of the results. It is also crucial to clearly discuss if the metrics selected are intended to be widely applicable, or mostly relevant only to the region, scale, and/or subset of disasters considered in the published demonstration.
CONCLUSION
Empirical validation remains a fundamental, but rarely attempted, final step for disaster index creation. (11) We find that the CDRI, RCI, and SVI indices perform best for explaining damages and fatalities, while SoVI performs best for damages and disaster declarations. However, we encourage end users to carefully think about the strengths and weaknesses of each index before making a decision about which to implement. We stress that these results are not meant to condemn an index for poor performance as there are numerous potential outcomes that a disaster index may address. We do believe, however, that the outcomes we use are logically based and well justified for the purposes of this paper. In order to understand which index should be used for different purposes, it is fundamentally important to have a clear purpose and to empirically validate the final index based on that purpose. However, even if an index has a clear purpose and is empirically verified, there are still limitations to the policy relevance as it may not be clear which metrics can be improved to increase resilience. Unfortunately, aggregate level validation does not address this.
Further, if the indices are all relative, improvements in resilience across all locations will not be reflected in the index. While great strides have been made thus far in the arena, important work remains to quantify resilience and vulnerability. Index approaches may have most utility as a screening level tool that can be used to identify specific critical function for further investigation and modeling, such as through a network science approach (47) , than as a decision support tool for direct community investment.
Understanding community resilience and vulnerability to natural disasters remains a policy priority around the world. Corporations, governments, and non-profit organizations are investing time and resources into measuring and improving resilience across many disciplines, so much so that the term has evolved into a new identity. (28, (41) (42) (43) Quantifying resilience and vulnerability through aggregation of theoretically justified metrics has become a popular approach to aid in decision making. However, we show that empirical validation remains an important final step.
While indices may be well substantiated by theory, they may not perform as expected. We show that this is often the case with five top disaster indices in the United States by validating index performance against property losses, damages, and fatalities. Although some indices may not have been intended to assess the outcomes we selected, a lack of clear index purpose or definition of relevant outcomes decreases the policy relevance. Clearer, validated index functionality is fundamentally important in order to better understand the value of index results and properly apply these lessons for their intended purposes. By validating index performance using outcomes related to the stated objectives of the indices, policy makers can have confidence that improvements in resilience or reduction in vulnerability, as recorded by changes in a disaster index, will translate to specific desired improvements.
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B. Results Within Shared Index Geographies
In this section, we present correlation and regression results using only observations from the geographic intersection of all five indices. This geographic intersection is 14 counties across Alabama, Florida, and Mississippi, limited by the spatial scales of BRIC, CDRI, and RCI. Our intent is to test each index using the full geographic extent for which it was created and testing each index against the null hypothesis that the index does not explain the outcomes of interest. However, we also present these results that directly compare each index across the same geography. The results are briefly discussed below.
Table A displays the disaster index correlation coefficients across the intersecting geographic extents. When we restrict attention to the 14 counties in common between all five indices, the correlation coefficients are different both in magnitude as well as, in some cases, sign. Only BRIC/CDRI, SVI/CDRI, and SVI/RCI correlation remain the expected correlation sign. These results reflect how, across larger spatial scales, these indices may tend together, but across individual counties, each index may estimate very different levels of resilience or vulnerability. Table V in our paper, but with our sample restricted to the 14 common counties across disaster indices. While the magnitudes of the estimated coefficients change, as is to be expected with attention to a different spatial scale, we find the sign and statistical significance of each variable remains the same, except for RCI, which has altered signs and is now inconsistent with the theoretical sign. Therefore, even across this geographic scale, the performance of each individual index holds for damages. Table C presents the regression results for the fatalities functions restricting attention to the counties shared by each disaster index. Similar to the damage results, we find that each index continues to perform with the same sign and statistical significance of the full sample results. These results give us confidence in the consistent performance of each index. We note that the magnitudes of the estimated coefficients change, as the restricted index sample will have different mean and variance than the full sample. Table C presents the regression results for our disaster declaration functions across the geographically restricted sample. We note that the sample size, at 14, is too small to draw any conclusions from the results and none of the estimated index coefficients are statistically significant. However, we note that of the three indices that had statistically significant coefficients in Table VII in our main results (BRIC, SoVI, and SVI), they have maintained the same coefficient sign in these regressions. Therefore, these restricted sample results remain consistent with our main results. 
